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Abstract
Single-image super-resolution aims to generate a high-
resolution version of a low-resolution image, which serves
as an essential component in many computer vision ap-
plications. This paper investigates the robustness of deep
learning-based super-resolution methods against adversar-
ial attacks, which can significantly deteriorate the super-
resolved images without noticeable distortion in the at-
tacked low-resolution images. It is demonstrated that state-
of-the-art deep super-resolution methods are highly vulner-
able to adversarial attacks. Different levels of robustness of
different methods are analyzed theoretically and experimen-
tally. We also present analysis on transferability of attacks,
and feasibility of targeted attacks and universal attacks.
1. Introduction
Single-image super-resolution, which is to generate a
high-resolution version of a low-resolution image, is one
of the popular research areas in recent years. While sim-
ple interpolation methods such as bilinear and bicubic up-
scaling have been used popularly, the development of deep
learning-based approaches, which is triggered by a sim-
ple convolutional network model named super-resolution
convolutional neural network (SRCNN) [7], offers much
better quality of the upscaled images. The improvement
of the super-resolution technique extends its applications
to broader areas, including video streaming, surveillance,
medical diagnosis, and satellite photography [23].
While many deep learning-based super-resolution meth-
ods have been introduced, their robustness against intended
attacks has not been thoroughly studied. The vulnerabil-
ity of deep networks has been an important issue in recent
years, since various investigations report that the attack can
fool the deep classification models and can cause severe se-
curity issues [9, 17]. The similar issues can be raised for the
super-resolution applications, since the deteriorated outputs
can directly affect the reliability and stability of the systems
employing super-resolution as their key components.
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of deep
learning-based super-resolution against adversarial attacks,
which is the first work to the best of our knowledge. Our at-
tacks generate perturbations in the input images, which are
not visually noticeable but can largely deteriorate the qual-
ity of the outputs. The main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as follows.
• We propose three adversarial attack methods for
super-resolution, which slightly perturb a given low-
resolution image but result in significantly deteriorated
output images, including basic, universal, and partial
attacks. The methods are based on the methods widely
used in the image classification tasks, and we optimize
them for the super-resolution tasks.
• We present thorough analysis of the robustness of the
super-resolution methods, by providing experimen-
tal results using the adversarial attack methods. We
employ various state-of-the-art deep learning-based
super-resolution methods having variable characteris-
tics in terms of model structure, training objective, and
model size.
• We further investigate the relation of robustness to the
model properties and measure the transferability. In
addition, we provide three advanced topics, including
targeted attack, attack-agnostic robustness measure-
ment, and simple defense methods of the attack.
2. Related Work
Super-resolution. Recently, the trend of super-resolution
researches has been shifted to the deep learning-based
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methods. One of the notable methods that achieve much im-
proved performance is the enhanced deep super-resolution
(EDSR) model [12]. Later, Zhang et al. [25] propose a more
advanced network model named residual channel attention
network (RCAN), which applies an attention mechanism to
exploit image features effectively.
While the aforementioned methods focus on achiev-
ing high performance in terms of peak signal-to-noise ra-
tio (PSNR), some researchers argue that considering only
such a distortion measure does not necessarily enhance
perceptual image quality [5]. To deal with this, percep-
tually optimized super-resolution methods are proposed,
which employ generative adversarial networks (GANs) [8].
One of the state-of-the-art methods is the enhanced super-
resolution generative adversarial network (ESRGAN) [19],
which generates more visually appealing outputs than other
conventional methods, even though the PSNR values are
lower. Choi et al. [6] develop the four-pass perceptual
enhanced upscaling super-resolution (4PP-EUSR) method,
which considers both the quantitative and perceptual quality
to obtain more natural upscaled images.
Since super-resolution is also a useful component in
mobile applications, some studies focus on economizing
the computational resource while reasonable performance
is maintained. For instance, Ahn et al. [3] propose the
cascading residual network (CARN) and its mobile version
(CARN-M), which employ cascading residual blocks with
shared model parameters.
Adversarial attack. Recent studies show that deep im-
age classifiers are vulnerable to various adversarial attacks.
Szegedy et al. [18] propose an optimization-based attack
method that aims to minimize the amount of perturbation
with changing the classification result of a classifier. Good-
fellow et al. [9] develop the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM), which uses the sign of the gradients that are ob-
tained from the classifier. Kurakin et al. [11] extend it to an
iterative approach (I-FGSM), which shows higher success
rate of the attack than FGSM. These attacks are known as
strong attack methods that can fool almost every state-of-
the-art image classifier with high success rate [17].
Some studies provide in-depth analysis of the robust-
ness of deep learning models. Liu et al. [13] measure
transferability of the adversarial images, which is to find
out whether the perturbations found for a classifier also
work for another classifier. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [15]
investigate a universal perturbation that can be applied to
all images in a given dataset. Weng et al. [20] proposed a
theoretical robustness measure, which does not depend on
a specific attack method.
Adversarial attack on super-resolution. Recently, com-
bining the super-resolution tasks with adversarial attacks
has emerged. Mustafa et al. [16] presents a method em-
ploying super-resolution to defense deep image classifiers
against adversarial attacks. Yin et al. [22] employ the ad-
versarial attack on super-resolution to fool the subsequent
computer vision tasks. However, these studies investigate
the effectiveness of the adversarial attack for other tasks
rather than the super-resolution task itself, including image
classification, style transfer, and image captioning, where
the super-resolution is used as a pre-processing step be-
fore the main tasks. Therefore, the robustness of super-
resolution itself against adversarial attacks, which is inves-
tigated in this paper, has not been addressed previously.
3. Attacks on Super-Resolution
3.1. Basic attack
The goal of the adversarial attack on super-resolution
models is to inject a small amount of perturbation in the
given input image so that the perturbation is not visually
perceivable but results in significant deterioration in the
super-resolved output. To do this, we develop an algorithm
based on the idea of I-FGSM [11], which is one of the most
widely used strong attacks for classification models.
Let X0 denote the original low-resolution input image
and X denote the attacked version of X0. From these im-
ages, we obtain the super-resolved high-resolution images
f(X0) and f(X), respectively, via a given super-resolution
model f(·). Our objective is to maximize the amount of
deterioration in the super-resolved output, which can be de-
fined as:
L(X,X0) = ||f(X)− f(X0)||2. (1)
To find an X to minimize (1) with bounded `∞-norm con-
straint (‖X − X0‖∞ ≤ α), we adopt the I-FGSM update
rule that iteratively updatesX by:
X˜n+1 = clip0,1
(
Xn +
α
T
sgn
(∇L(Xn,X0))) (2)
Xn+1 = clip−α,α(X˜n+1 −X0) +X0 (3)
where T is the number of iterations, sgn
(∇L(Xn,X0)) is
the sign of the gradient of (1), and
clipa,b(X) = min
(
max(X, a), b
)
. (4)
The term α not only controls the amount of contribution
that the calculated gradient provides at each iteration, but
also limits the maximum amount of perturbation to prevent
noticeable changes of the attacked input image. The final
adversarial example is obtained byX = XT .
3.2. Universal attack
Although an adversarial image can be found for each im-
age as in Section 3.1, it is also possible to find an image-
agnostic adversarial perturbation, which can affect any in-
put image for a certain super-resolution method [15]. We
2
Method # parameters # layers GAN-based
EDSR [12] 43.1M 69 -
EDSR-baseline [12] 1.5M 37 -
RCAN [25] 15.6M 815 -
4PP-EUSR [6] 6.3M 95 X
ESRGAN [19] 16.7M 351 X
RRDB [19] 16.7M 351 -
CARN [3] 1.1M 34 -
CARN-M [3] 0.3M 43 -
Table 1. Properties of the super-resolution methods.
apply this concept in our study by altering the formulation
of our basic attack as follows.
Assume that there areK images in the dataset, where the
k-th image is denoted asXk0 . With a universal perturbation
∆, we can obtain the adversarial images as:
Xk = clip0,1(X
k
0 + ∆). (5)
Then, we compute the average amount of deterioration as:
F(∆) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
L(Xk,Xk0). (6)
Starting from ∆0 = 0, the universal perturbation is updated
iteratively as:
∆n+1 = clip−α,α
(
∆n +
α
T
sgn
(∇F(∆n))). (7)
The final universal perturbation is obtained by ∆ = ∆T .
3.3. Partial attack
The basic attack in Section 3.1 finds a perturbation cov-
ering the whole region of the given image. We further in-
vestigate the robustness of the super-resolution methods by
attacking only some part of the image, but measuring the
amount of deterioration in the region that is not being at-
tacked. With this experiment, we can examine how much
the perturbation permeates into the adjacent regions during
super-resolution.
Let M denote a binary mask of the perturbation ∆,
where only the region to be attacked is set to 1. The masked
perturbation is ∆ ◦M, where ◦ denotes the element-wise
multiplication. Then, (2) can be modified as:
X˜n+1 = clip0,1
(
Xn+
α
T
sgn
(∇LM(Xn,X0))◦M) (8)
where
LM(X,X0) =
∣∣∣∣(f(X)− f(X0)) ◦ (1−MH)∣∣∣∣2. (9)
In (9),MH is a high-resolution counterpart ofM. The term
(1−MH) ensures that the amount of deterioration is calcu-
lated only on the unperturbed regions. The final adversarial
example is obtained byX = XT .
4. Experimental Results
Datasets. We employ three image datasets that are widely
used for benchmarking super-resolution methods: Set5 [4],
Set14 [24], and BSD100 [14]. Each dataset consists of 5,
14, and 100 images, respectively.
Super-resolution methods. We consider eight state-
of-the-art deep learning-based super-resolution methods
having various model sizes and properties, including EDSR
[12], EDSR-baseline [12], RCAN [25], 4PP-EUSR [6],
ESRGAN [19], RRDB [19], CARN [3], and CARN-M [3].
Table 1 shows their characteristics in terms of the number
of model parameters, the number of convolutional layers,
and whether to employ GANs for training. EDSR-baseline
is a smaller version of EDSR, RRDB is an alternative ver-
sion of ESRGAN trained without the GAN, and CARN-M
is a lightweight version of CARN in terms of the number
of model parameters. In addition, we also consider the
bicubic interpolation to compare its robustness against the
adversarial attacks with that of the deep learning-based
methods. We consider a scaling factor of 4 for all the
super-resolution methods. In addition, we employ the
pre-trained models provided by the original authors.
Implementation details. Our adversarial attack meth-
ods are implemented on the TensorFlow framework
[2]. For all the attack methods, we set α ∈
{1/255, 2/255, 4/255, 8/255, 16/255, 32/255} and T =
50. For the universal attack, a perturbation ∆ with a fixed
spatial resolution is required in order to apply it to all im-
ages in a dataset. Therefore, we crop the center region of
each input image with a fixed resolution. For the partial at-
tack, we set the mask M so as to attack the central part of
the input image, i.e.,
M(x,y) =
{
1 if w4 ≤ x < 3w4 , h4 ≤ y < 3h4
0 otherwise
(10)
where M(x,y) is the value of M at (x, y), and w and h are
the width and height of the input image, respectively.
Performance measurement. We measure the robustness
of the super-resolution methods against our adversarial at-
tack methods in terms of PSNR. For low-resolution (LR)
images, we calculate the PSNR values between the original
and attacked images, i.e., X0 and X. For super-resolved
(SR) images, PSNR is measured between the output images
obtained from the original and attacked input images, i.e.,
f(X0) and f(X). We report the averaged PSNR values for
each dataset. For the partial attack, we calculate the PSNR
values only for the outer region of the output image that
corresponds to the masked region during the attack.
4.1. Basic attack
Figure 1 compares the performance of the super-
resolution methods in terms of PSNR for the I-FGSM attack
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Figure 1. Comparison of the PSNR values of low-resolution (LR) and super-resolved (SR) images with respect to different α values for the
basic attack on the Set5 [4], Set14 [24], and BSD100 [14] datasets.
Ground-truth EDSR EDSR-baseline RCAN 4PP-EUSR
ESRGAN RRDB CARN CARN-M Bicubic
Figure 2. Visual comparison of the super-resolved outputs for the inputs attacked with α = 8/255. In each case, (top-left) is the original
input in Set5 [4], (top-right) is the adversarial input, and (bottom) is the output obtained from the adversarial input. The input images are
enlarged two times for better visualization.
explained in Section 3.1. As α increases, quality degrada-
tion becomes severe in both the LR and SR images. How-
ever, it is much more significant in the SR images than the
LR images (i.e., lower PSNR values) except for the bicubic
interpolation. For example, on the Set5 dataset, the PSNR
values of LR and SR images for the EDSR model are 41.37
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Figure 3. Comparison of the PSNR values of SR images for BSD100 [14] with respect to the model sizes in terms of (a) the number of
model parameters and (b) the number of convolutional layers (α = 8/255). Blue and red colors indicate the models trained with and
without GANs, respectively.
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PSNR (dB)
Target model
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EDSR 16.14 32.88 25.82 23.86 16.26 23.57 32.80 37.74 
EDSR-baseline 24.44 19.19 23.65 21.23 15.15 22.29 26.82 33.62 
RCAN 30.57 35.49 15.89 26.60 18.94 29.74 35.57 40.46 
4PP-EUSR 27.25 32.76 26.83 15.02 16.16 24.71 32.87 37.97 
ESRGAN 28.64 33.11 28.59 24.28 9.57 24.46 33.30 36.56 
RRDB 25.55 33.09 25.31 23.77 15.86 14.59 32.91 38.11 
CARN 24.12 26.05 23.83 21.45 15.24 22.15 19.40 33.51
CARN-M 27.34 28.20 27.20 23.49 16.27 26.77 28.20 26.66 
Figure 4. Comparison of the transferability in terms of PSNR for
the BSD100 dataset [14] when α = 8/255. Red and blue colors
indicate the lowest and highest PSNR values (except the diagonal
cells) for each target model, respectively.
and 17.05 dB, respectively, when α = 8/255. Note that
two images having a PSNR value higher than 30 dB can be
regarded as visually identical images [10].
Figure 2 shows example LR and SR images for
α = 8/255. Overall, there is no obvious difference
between the original and perturbed input images for all
the super-resolution methods. However, significant quality
deterioration can be observed in the SR images for all
methods. ESRGAN shows the worst visual quality with
degradation in all parts of the SR image, which can also
be observed as the lowest PSNR values in Figures 1d, 1e,
and 1f. For the other super-resolution models, fingerprint-
like patterns are observed. This proves that all the deep
learning-based super-resolution methods are highly vul-
nerable against the adversarial attack. In comparison, the
bicubic method, although having lower super-resolution
quality on clean data, is much more robust compared with
the deep learning-based approaches.
Relation to model objectives. ESRGAN and 4PP-EUSR,
which employ GANs for considering perceptual quality
improvement, produce more significantly degraded outputs
than the other methods. Since ESRGAN has exactly the
same structure as RRDB but is trained with a different
objective (i.e., considering perceptual quality), the more
significant vulnerability of ESRGAN than RRDB implies
that differences of the training objectives affect the robust-
ness against the adversarial attacks. It is known that the
methods employing GANs tend to generate sharper textures
than the other methods to ensure naturally appealing qual-
ity of the upscaled images [5]. Therefore, these methods
amplify small perturbations significantly and produce
undesirable textures, which makes them more vulnerable to
the adversarial attacks than the methods without GANs.
Relation to model sizes. It is observed that the vulnerabil-
ity of the super-resolution models is related to their model
sizes. For example, EDSR-baseline, which is a smaller
version of EDSR, shows higher PSNR values for SR images
than EDSR, as shown in Figures 1d, 1e, and 1f. This is con-
firmed in Figure 3, where we compare the robustness with
respect to the model size. The figure explains that the PSNR
values of SR images tend to decrease when more model
parameters or more convolutional layers are employed.
Further analysis on this phenomenon is given in Section 4.3.
Transferability. In the classification tasks, the “transfer-
ability” means the possibility that a misclassified adversar-
ial example is also misclassified by another classifier [13].
We also examine the transferability of adversarial attacks
in super-resolution. In other words, an adversarial exam-
ple that is found for a “source” super-resolution model is
inputted to another “target” model, and the PSNR value of
the output image is measured.
Figure 4 summarizes the transferability for the deep
learning-based super-resolution models on the BSD100
dataset, where α = 8/255. The figure shows that the adver-
sarial examples are transferable between different models
to some extent, and the level of transferability differs de-
pending on the combination of the source and target mod-
els. The adversarial examples found for CARN and EDSR-
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Figure 5. Comparison of the PSNR values of LR and SR images with respect to different α values for the universal attack on the BSD100
dataset [14].
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 6. Visual examples of the universal attack with α = 4/255 on the BSD100 dataset [14] for the RCAN model. (a) LR (original) (b)
Perturbation (c) LR (attacked) (d) SR (e–f) Other examples obtained from the images attacked with the same perturbation
baseline are highly transferable, while those for RCAN are
the least transferable. The result implies that RCAN has its
own specific characteristics in recovering the textures from
the input images, which makes the perturbations associated
with such characteristics less effective in the other super-
resolution methods.
4.2. Universal attack
Figure 5 compares the performance of the super-
resolution methods for the BSD100 dataset with respect to
different α values when the universal attack is applied. The
figure confirms that the super-resolution models are also
vulnerable to the image-agnostic universal attack, although
the universal attack requires larger perturbations of the in-
put images (i.e., slightly lower PSNR values in Figure 5a
than in Figure 1c) and is slightly less powerful than the
image-specific attack (i.e., slightly higher PSNR values in
Figure 5b than in Figure 1f). Compared to the results of the
basic attack (Figure 1), the same tendency is observed: both
ESRGAN and 4PP-EUSR are the most vulnerable and the
bicubic interpolation is the most robust.
Figure 6 shows visual examples of the universal attack
for RCAN, where α is 4/255. From all images of the
BSD100 dataset, our attack method finds a universal pertur-
bation (Figure 6b), which changes the input image shown
in Figure 6a to the one in Figure 6c. While the attacked
LR image has hardly noticeable differences from the origi-
nal image, its upscaled version contains significant artifacts
as shown in Figure 6d. Similar artifacts can be observed in
the other SR images attacked with the same perturbation,
as shown in Figures 6e and 6f. This demonstrates that the
state-of-the-art super-resolution methods using deep learn-
ing are also vulnerable to the universal perturbation.
4.3. Partial attack
Figure 7 shows the PSNR values of the SR images for
the partial attack with respect to different α values. The
rank of the super-resolution methods in terms of PSNR is
the same to that for the basic attack, except that the PSNR
values of the partial attack are much higher than those of
the basic attack, since the region where PSNR is measured
is not directly perturbed in the LR image. This shows that
the propagation of the perturbation to the neighboring pixels
during upscaling accounts for different levels of vulnerabil-
ity of different super-resolution models. For instance, all
the PSNR values of ESRGAN, except for α = 1 in Set5,
are lower than 30 dB due to the partial attack.
Figure 8 shows example SR images obtained from an
image in the Set14 dataset that are partially attacked with
α = 8/255. The degradation due to the attack propagates
outside of the attacked region, which are particularly no-
ticeable for ESRGAN and RRDB. This is because the ker-
nels of the convolutional layers operate on not only the pixel
of a target position but also its adjacent pixels. Moreover,
the propagation of the perturbation due to such operations
is further extended through multiple convolutional layers,
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Figure 7. Comparison of the PSNR values of SR images with respect to different α values for the partial attack.
Ground-truth EDSR EDSR-baseline RCAN 4PP-EUSR
ESRGAN RRDB CARN CARN-M Bicubic
Figure 8. Visual comparison of the SR images for the partial adversarial attack with α = 8/255 on an image of Set14 [24]. The regions
marked with yellow boxes correspond to the regions where the attack is applied in the LR images.
which accounts for the result shown in Figure 3b.
5. Advanced Topics
5.1. Targeted attack
In the case of the classification tasks, it is possible to
attack an image so that a classifier wrongly classifies the
image as a specific target class. We present a showcase
demonstrating that this concept can be also applied to the
super-resolution methods. In other words, instead of de-
grading quality of the output image, the targeted attack
makes a super-resolution method generate an image that is
more similar to a target image than the original ground-truth
one. For this, we modify (2) as:
X˜n+1 = clip0,1
(
Xn − α
T
sgn
(∇L(Xn,X∗))) (11)
whereX∗ is the target image.
For demonstration, we use two adjacent frames of a
video named “foreman” [1]. Figure 9 shows the result for
4PP-EUSR, where α = 16/255 and T = 50. The figure
LR (original) LR (target) LR (attacked)
HR (original) HR (target) SR (attacked)
Figure 9. Result of the targeted attack with α = 16/255 using two
frames of a video “foreman” [1] for 4PP-EUSR [6].
shows that the targeted attack is successful: the perturba-
tion is generated so as to make the super-resolution method
produce the upscaled output (“SR (attacked)”), which looks
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Figure 10. PSNR vs. the robustness index for the BSD100 dataset
[14] when α = 1/255. Each point corresponds to each image in
the dataset.
more similar to the target high-resolution (HR) image with
half-closed eyes (“HR (target)”) than the original ground-
truth image with open eyes (“HR (original)”), while the at-
tacked input image (“LR (attacked)”) still looks more sim-
ilar to the original image (“LR (original)”) than the low-
resolution version of the target image (“LR (target)”). In
addition, we conduct a subjective test with 20 human ob-
servers, and 10 of them recognized the attacked output
(“SR (attacked)”) as closed eyes. These results have serious
security implications: attacks on super-resolution can not
only compromise the fundamental goal of super-resolution
(i.e., image quality enhancement) but also jeopardize fur-
ther manual or automatic examination of the super-resolved
images (e.g., identifying persons or objects in surveillance
cameras, recognizing text in images, etc.).
5.2. Robustness measure
Recently, Weng et al. [20] propose an attack-agnostic
robustness measure of classification models, called cross
Lipschitz extreme value for network robustness (CLEVER),
which does not depend on specific attack methods. It esti-
mates the lower bound of robustness using the cross Lips-
chitz constant based on the extreme value theory. We apply
the core idea of this method to the super-resolution tasks
in order to theoretically validate the experimental results
shown in Section 4.
Let X0 denote the original input image. We first obtain
Ns random perturbations, which are within [−α, α] for each
pixel. Let ∆(i) denote the i-th random perturbation. Then,
we compute bi = ||∇L(X0 + ∆(i),X0)||1 for all pertur-
bations, where L is defined in (1). Finally, we regard the
maximum bi as the robustness index; a large robustness in-
dex indicates high vulnerability. We set Ns and α to 1024
and 1/255, respectively.
Figure 10 shows the PSNR values for SR images and
robustness indices of the eight deep learning-based super-
resolution methods for the BSD100 dataset, where the
PSNR values are obtained from the basic attack with the
same α value (Section 4.1). The result shows that the
robustness index is strongly correlated to PSNR. For in-
stance, ESRGAN has the largest robustness indices, which
shows the lowest PSNR values; the EDSR-baseline model
has the similar robustness as the CARN model in terms
of both PSNR and the robustness index. Furthermore, in
each method, the robustness index successfully explains rel-
ative vulnerability of different images. The applicability of
the CLEVER method for explaining the robustness of the
super-resolution methods implies that the underlying mech-
anisms of the adversarial attacks share similarity between
the classification and super-resolution tasks.
5.3. Defense
We show two simple defense methods against attacks.
First, we adopt a resizing method [21] by reducing the size
of the attacked input image by one pixel and then resizing
it back to the original resolution, which is then inputted to
the SR model. With this, PSNR for EDSR with α = 8/255
increases from 16.14 to 25.01 dB. Second, we employ the
geometric self-ensemble method used in the EDSR model
[12]. With this, PSNR for EDSR with α = 8/255 increases
from 16.14 to 23.47 dB. More advanced defense methods
can be investigated in the future work.
6. Conclusion
We have investigated the robustness of deep learning-
based super-resolution methods against adversarial attacks,
for which the attack methods for the classification tasks
are optimized for our objectives. Our results showed that
state-of-the-art deep learning-based super-resolution meth-
ods are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which is
largely due to the perturbation propagation through the con-
volutional operation. It was possible to measure different
levels of robustness of different methods using the attack-
agnostic robustness measure. We also showed the feasi-
bility of generating universal attacks and transferring at-
tacks across super-resolution methods. Furthermore, it was
shown that the targeted attack can change the content of the
image during super-resolution.
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Supplementary Material
In this supplementary material, we provide additional
results that could not be included in the main paper due to
the page limit.
More visual comparisons of the basic attack. We provide
two additional visual comparisons of the basic attack
shown in Section 4.1 of the main paper. Figure 11 shows
additional example low-resolution (LR) and super-resolved
(SR) images obtained from an image of Set14 [24] with
α = 8/255. Undesirable artifacts similar to those observed
in Figure 2 of the main paper can be found. Figure 12
shows the example images obtained by the EDSR model
[12] with different α values. As α increases, the upscaled
images become more deteriorated, whereas the perturbed
input images still look similar to the original image. The
results support that the deep super-resolution methods are
highly vulnerable against the adversarial attack in various
cases.
Visualized results of transferability. In Section 4.1 of
the main paper, we compared the transferability of the
deep super-resolution methods in terms of peak signal-
to-noise ratio (PSNR). According to Figure 4 in the main
paper, EDSR-baseline [12] and CARN [3] show higher
transferability than the other models, whereas RCAN [25]
and ESRGAN [19] show lower transferability. Here, we
visually explain the transferability of these four super-
resolution methods in Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16. In the
figures, a LR image in the BSD100 dataset [14] is attacked
with one of the super-resolution models and inputted to
the other super-resolution models including EDSR [12],
EDSR-baseline, RCAN, 4PP-EUSR [6], ESRGAN, RRDB
[19], CARN, and CARN-M [3]. In Figures 13 and 14,
the attacked LR image successfully deteriorates the SR
images obtained from the other methods, where similar
fingerprint-like textures are observed as in Figure 2 of the
main paper. On the other hand, in Figures 15 and 16, the
perturbations found for RCAN and ESRGAN are not so
effective for the other models; the amounts of deterioration
in the SR images produced by the other models are much
smaller than those triggered by the perturbations for
EDSR-baseline and CARN (Figures 13 and 14).
Transferability of the universal attack. We examine the
universal attack across datasets, i.e., the universal pertur-
bation obtained for the BSD100 dataset [14] is applied to
the images of the Set14 dataset [24]. Figure 17 shows the
super-resolved (SR) images obtained by the RCAN model
[25], where the perturbation shown in Figure 6b of the
main paper is applied. This result verifies that the universal
attack is transferable to unseen images.
Advanced partial attack. The objective of the partial
attack in Section 4.3 of the main paper is to examine how
the perturbation planted in a region propagates spatially
outside the region. Partial attacks with more complex
masks can also be done using the proposed method.
Figure 18 shows the attack results where the perturbation
is applied on the face region of an image in Set5 [4]. It is
observed that strong degradations are introduced around
the face boundaries.
Additional example of the targeted attack. We provide
an additional example of the targeted attack, which is
explained in Section 5.1 of the main paper. Figure 19
shows the result. In the figure, the original number 87
in the original high-resolution image (“HR (original)”) is
changed to 89 in the SR version (“SR (attacked)”). We
conduct a subjective test with 20 human observers, and all
the observers recognized the number in the red box of “SR
(attacked)” as 89 instead of 87.
Robustness measure. We employed the “robustness index”
in Section 5.2 of the main paper. Here we provide additional
results obtained with different α values (i.e., α = 2/255 and
α = 4/255). Figure 20 depicts the relationship between the
PSNR values for SR images obtained with the basic attack
(Section 4.1 of the main paper) and the robustness indices of
the deep super-resolution models for the BSD100 dataset,
where α = 2/255 and α = 4/255. When these figures
and Figure 10 of the main paper are compared, increasing
α results in decreasing the PSNR values and increasing the
robustness index values, as expected. In addition, as in the
result with α = 1/255 (Figure 10 of the main paper), the
robustness index is strongly correlated to PSNR regardless
of the value of α, which supports the usefulness of the ro-
bustness index for explaining the relative vulnerability of
the different super-resolution methods.
10
Ground-truth EDSR EDSR-baseline RCAN 4PP-EUSR
ESRGAN RRDB CARN CARN-M Bicubic
Figure 11. Visual comparison of the super-resolved outputs for the inputs attacked with α = 8/255. In each case, (top-left) is the original
input in Set14 [24], (top-right) is the adversarial input, and (bottom) is the output obtained from the adversarial input. The input images
are enlarged two times for better visualization.
α = 1/255 α = 2/255 α = 4/255 α = 8/255 α = 16/255
Figure 12. Visual comparison of the super-resolved outputs for the inputs attacked with different α values. In each case, (top-left) is the
original input in Set14 [24], (top-right) is the adversarial input, and (bottom) is the output obtained on EDSR [12]. The input images are
enlarged two times for better visualization.
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Figure 13. Visual examples of the transferred attack where EDSR-baseline [12] is used as the source super-resolution model with α =
8/255. An image in the BSD100 [14] dataset is used.
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Figure 14. Visual examples of the transferred attack where CARN [3] is used as the source super-resolution model with α = 8/255. An
image in the BSD100 [14] dataset is used.
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Figure 15. Visual examples of the transferred attack where RCAN [25] is used as the source super-resolution model with α = 8/255. An
image in the BSD100 [14] dataset is used.
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Figure 16. Visual examples of the transferred attack where ESRGAN [19] is used as the source super-resolution model with α = 8/255.
An image in the BSD100 [14] dataset is used.
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Figure 17. Results of the universal attack applied to the Set14 dataset [24].
EDSR RCAN 4PP-EUSR ESRGAN
Figure 18. Results of the partial attack on the face region (α = 16/255).
HR (original) LR (attacked) SR (attacked)
Figure 19. Targeted attack result using a score card image (Flickr, juggernautco, CC BY 2.0) with α = 16/255 for ESRGAN. The attack
targets to change the number in the red box to 89.
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Figure 20. PSNR vs. the robustness index for the BSD100 dataset [14] when α = 2/255 and α = 4/255. Each point corresponds to each
image in the dataset.
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